The story of the “logical changes” of the players and the wrong model of play.
Serbia lost the game because it conceded few goals and scored even fewer.
Where is the mistake?
Is it possible to help your team even when they play extremely badly in the attack?
We do not know whether Uroš Bregar, the coach of Serbia, makes decisions independently based on feelings and personal monitoring of the game or during the game he has information about the performance of individual players, but at first glance, he made decisions about player changes logically.
In the first half, he changed 7 different combinations of back players and pivots in search of a solution to the problem.
In the end, he found a partial solution at half-time.
24 out of 28 team attacks, Marina Dmitrović played on the right-back, the team scored 5 goals in those 24 attacks, and Marina scored 0 goals from 4 attempts.
Uroš made a good decision at halftime and in the second half played Andjela Janjušević who scored 2 goals from 2 attempts, and the efficiency of the team with her in the game was significantly better: the team scored 13 goals from 27 attempts.
Could the coach have received information about the influence of Dmitrović on the team’s efficiency during the first half in order to make a faster decision to introduce Janjušević earlier?
Although Serbia scored 5 more goals in the second half than in the first half, it may have had room for better efficiency.
The curiosity of the second half is in the comparison of team efficiency depending on which player played on the center-back.
When the center back was Kristina Lišćević, the team scored 8 goals from 21 attacks, and when the center-back played Tamara Radojević, the team was significantly more efficient: 5 goals from 8 attacks.
It is a pity for Serbia that Radojevic did not play more, and Liscevic less.
What is difficult for us coaches to assess in such situations is the influence of Liščević and Radojević on the efficiency of the team because they are not always “guilty” of failure, so we look for solutions elsewhere.
Was the above-mentioned important for the overall result?
Yes.
Could Serbia have won with such a distribution of minutes?
Yes.
The key element of the defeat, even with such extremely bad offensive effects, was the game system.
In a game in which the team scored 11 goals from 39 attacks, and from various forms of attack from running (counter-attack, fast center, and fast-break) 10 goals from 18 attempts to decide how to play is a systemic direction of the game.
Especially knowing that in the first half the ratio was 3 goals from 19 attempts on set defense and 5 goals from 9 attempts from running.
A fact-based decision in the halftime of the match would in no way lead to 20 attacks on the set defense with only 9 attacks from running.
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If you are interested in similar analyzes of some other matches, you can watch them here: https://handballevolution.com/hr/category/uncategorized-hr/analize-utakmica-uncategorized-hr/
lyzes of some other matches, you can check them out here: https://handballevolution.com/category/uncategorized/match-analysis/
